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AGENCY-ATTORNEYS-IMPLIED POWER OF ATTORNEY IN FoRE-
CLOSURE SUIT TO BID AT SALE-Does an attorney of record,
especially in an equity case, have implied authority to purchase for
his client property offered for sale in a suit to which such client is a
party ?
This is the question raised in the recent case of Foxworth v.
Bank' and answered in the affirmative by the court, Cothran, J.
entering a very able and vigorous dissent.
The pertinent facts are that P and M banks each held notes
secured by a single mortgage. The P Bank, its note falling due
first, instituted foreclosure proceedings and joined M Bank as defend-
ant. M Bank employed an attorney to represent it in the foreclosure
proceedings, the only issue between the two banks being whether
they should take pro rata. The court having deferred decision upon
this issue until after the sale, M's attorney bid the property in for
a sum sufficient to cover the claims of both banks. M Bank denying
the authority of its attorney to bid at the sale, a subsequent assignee
of the P Bank procured a rule to show cause why the M Bank
should not comply with the bid.
The circuit court in its written order held the M Bank account-
able for the act of its attorney on the ground, (1) that he had implied
power to bind the bank by reason of the relation of attorney and
client, (2) that the preponderance of the evidence established-
express authority for the action of the attorney, and (3) that, irre-
spective of implied or express authority, the bank had ratified the
bid of its attorney by unreasonable delay in disaffirming it.
This discussion must necessarily exclude the holding of the court
upon its last two grounds of express power and ratification since the
evidence upon which these holding were based is not available here;
but as to the first ground, it seems that the better reasoning and
clear weight of authority supports the dissenting opinion in deny-
ing that the attorney had implied authority to bid in the property for
the bank by reason of the fact that he had been representing it as
attorney in the foreclosure proceedings.2
'Foxworth v. Murchison National Bank (1926) 134 S. E. (S. C.) 428.
'Savery v. Sypher (1868) 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 157, 18 L. Ed. 822; Bauman
v. Eschallier (1911) 184 Fed. 710, 107 C. C. A. 44; Beardsley v. Root (1814)
11 Johns. (N. Y.) 464, 6 Am. Dec. 386; Washington v. Johnson (1846) 26
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The majority opinion, in support of its propostiion that an
attorney has implied power to purchase because of the relation of
attorney and client in a foreclosure proceeding, draws a fine line of
distinction between (1) the power of an attorney to purchase for
his client property sold under execution upon a lien in favor of the
client, which power, it is conceded, is clearly denied by the authori-
ties,8 and (2) the power of the attorney to purchase for his client
property sold under foreclosure proceedings in a case to which such
client is a party.
The court argues that the relation of attorney and client in an
equity case involving the sale of real estate does not terminate until
a sale and an order confirming the report of the sale;4 and that,
since the relation is not sooner terminated, therefore the attorney has
authority to do whatever, in his judgment, is necessary to protect
his client's interest,--even to the extent, without any further
authorization, of bidding in the property for the client. In support
of this position the court cites the Kansas case of Smith v. Cunning-
ham.5 It may be pointed out that there the plaintiff died after the
decree of foreclosure and before the sale, and the court merely held
that the general authority of the defendant's attorney continued until
confirmation of sale, and that under such authority the attorney may
waive notice of a motion, for revivor. It scarcely follows that the
authority of the mortgagor's attorney to waive a procedural defense
is a sound support for the doctrine, above enunciated, which would
allow the attorney for the mortgagee, under his general authority, to
purchase the property for his client at the foreclosure sale.
It seems that putting the authority of the attorney upon the
basis of the duration or termination of the period of the relation of
attorney and client is but a begging of the question. The real ques-
tion involved here is not how long does the relationship continue,
but, rather, how broad is the relationship while it does continue.
Tenn. (7 Humph.) 468; Fisher v. Mclnerney (1902) 137 Cal. 28, 69 Pac. 622,
2 R. C. L. 1011; Averill v. Williams (1847) 4 Denio (N. Y.) 295,; 47 Am.
Dec. 252; Note 132 Am. St. Rep. 179 (1909); Mayer v. Blease (1872) 4 S. C.
10; Gilliland v. Gasque (1875) 6 S. C. 406; Ex parte Jones (1896) 47 S. C.
393, 25 S. E. 285; 6 C. J. 156; Dixon v. Floyd (1906) 73 S. C. 202, 53 S. E.
167; Le Conte v. Irwin (1883) 19 S. C. 554; 3 A. & E. Ency. L. 329.
' See note 2 supra, all except first two cases cited are applicable here.
'3 A. & E. Ency. L. 327; McIver v. Thompson (1921) 117 S. C. 195, 108
S. E. 411; Cauthen v. Cauthen (1907) 76 S. C. 226, 56 S. E. 978; Smith v.
Cunningham (1898) 56 Kans. 552, 53 Pac. 760.
*Smith v. Cunningham (1898) 56 Kans. 552, 53 Pac. 760.
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The better reasoning and the few authorities directly in point clearly
support the rule that an attorney, in mortgage foreclosure proceed-
ings, as well as in execution sales, virtute officii, has no authority to
purchase property in the name of his client.6
P. H. RANSON.
BANKING-LABILITY OF BANK FOR VIOLATION OF CUSTOMER'S
INSTRUCTIONS-In Beacon Chocolate Co. v. Bank of Montreal
(1926) 14 Fed. (2nd.) 599, the plaintiff, a Boston corporation,
started a branch office in Chicago, and opened two accounts with the
defendant bank. One account was to be in the name of the plaintiff.
The defendant bank was notified that all checks from plaintiff's
customers were to be endorsed by H., Manager, with a rubber stamp
which contained the words, "For Deposit. The Bank of Montreal.
Beacon Chocolate Co., Boston, Mass.," and deposited to the account
of the plaintiff; and that no check could be drawn on this account
except by one of three men, all of Boston, and their signatures were
given to the defendant. The other account was in the name of H.,
Manager, and the weekly check from plaintiff to H. to pay the
expense of the branch office was to be deposited to this account.
Later H. deposited the checks he received from plaintiff's customers
in his account as manager and misappropriated the money. This
action is to recover the loss.
Held, that the defendent was liable. The defendant knew that
all checks to the plaintiff could be endorsed by H. only for deposit
to the account of the plaintiff corporation. When the defendant
bank permitted H. to deposit in his account as manager customer's
checks which should have been deposited in the plaintiff's account,
the defendant bank violated its understanding with the plaintiff and
thereby became liable for any resulting loss.
M. P. MYERS.
CANCELLATION-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-FRAUD WITHOUT
DAMAGE-CHANGE OF POSITION AS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR EQUITA-
BLE RELIEF-The contracting official, Albert B. Fall, then Secretary
of the Interior, received financial favor from Harry F. Sinclair,
president and owner of all the capital stock of the defending com-
pany, a bidder for leases on the Teapot Dome, to which company the
'Savery V. Sypher (1868) 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 157, 18 L. Ed. 822; Bauman
v. Eschallier (1911) 184 Fed. 711, 107 C. C. A.'44.
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leases were subsequently granted. In a suit brought by the United
States for the cancellation of these leases the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in reversing a decree of the District Court for the defendant,
and directing a decree for the government, held that fraud had been
practiced on the government and said "it matters not that the gov-
ernment is subjected to no pecuniary loss, or that the contract might
have been an advantageous one to it." United States v. Mammoth
Oil Co. (1926) 14 F (2d) 705.
Fraud in this instance defeated the proper and lawful function
of the government so that, whether or not pecuniary loss fell on the
United States, the decree is justified by public policy. No doubt
this exceptional basis exists for the decision, but nevertheless, the
holding suggests a reExamination of the soundness of the general
rule that fraud without damage is not actionable in equity. Pome-
roy's statement of this rule is supported by a great mass of
authority; he says "In short, the representation must be so material
that its falsity renders it unconscientious in the person making it to
enforce the agreement or other transaction that it has caused. Fraud
without resulting pecuniary damage is not a ground for the exer-
cise of remedial jurisdiction, equitable or legal; courts of justice do
not act as mere tribunals of conscience to enforce duties which are
purely moral."'
Admitting that exceptions should be made for instances of infi-
delity in public officials again we find that extraordinary dispensa-
tions are made where between private parties, fiduciary relations
have become tainted with fraud and corruption. "It may safely be
stated that the cases are very few, if any, in which any abuse of such
relations has been discovered that the complaining party has not been
relieved, whether any actual damage has been established or not."2
Perhaps cases that involve fiduciary relations, whether public or
private, can be called exceptional in which equity is seeking to pre-
serve the sanctity of the relationship rather than to relieve against
the result of the fraud. But in still another situation, equity refuses
to regard the absence of pecuniary loss as decisive, for in cases of
specific preformance the decree has been refused although the bar-
gain was not disadvantageous to the defendant because the transac-
'2 Pomeroy, Sec. 899 (1918) 4th ed.
'Henninger v. Heald (1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 431, 29 At]. 190.
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tion was tainted with fraud.3 The convenient metaphor as to 'clean
hands' rationalizes the refusal of the decree sought and allows equity
to further the principles of morality and ethics.
4
But where the ordinary mortal seeks to have cancelled a contract
secured by fraud where no fiduciary relation is involved there is no
relief unless he is able to prove some tangible pecuniary loss which
has fallen directly upon himself.5 "Courts are not mere tribunals
of conscience to enforce duties which are purely moral." This
sentence, however weak in justifying the law, is said to be practical.
It is submitted that most cases, in which the defrauded litigant elects
to rescind and finds that he cannot prove pecuniary loss, are not
instances in which mere tribunals of conscience are asked to enforce
purely moral duties. Fraud was a material factor that induced the
defrauded party to enter a bargain which otherwise he would not
have entered. If the contract is still executory, the 'clean hands'
rule offers a reason for denying specific performance and preventing
the defrauder forcing the defrauded to go through with the bargain.
But why does the defrauded party care whether he carries out the
tainted contract or not when there is no pecuniary loss to himself ?
Is it not that he has to change his position and is not change of posi-
tion detriment, intangibly or indirectly falling upon himself? If
the courts, by denying specific performance, decline to force the
defrauded person to change his position although he would not be
damaged thereby and thus remit the defrauder to an inadequate
remedy at law, why should they not also regard fraud without dam-
age, but resulting in a change of position, as a ground for can-
celling a contract? For example, an owner of residential property
refuses to sell to a bidder who wishes to use the residence for a
boarding house, because the owner desires to protect the interests
of his friends and neighbors. The bidder secures an agent, per-
sonally acceptable to the owner, to represent that he wants the
property for a home. The agent pays the actual value of the prop-
erty and then conveys to the undesirable bidder.8 Fraud was the
IKelly v. Ry. (1888) 74 Cal. 557; 16 Pac. 386; Fox v. Tabel (1895) 66
Conn. 397; 34 At. 107.
'2 Kent, Comm., Lect. 39, p. 490, 2d ed. Story 1 Eq. Jur., Sec. 206 (1839).
'Story 1 Eq. Jur., Sec. 187, 203 (1839). Marsh v. Cook, 32 N. J. Eq. 262.
Russell v. Transportation Co. (1924) 25 S. W. 462. Bispham's Principles of
Equity (1925), 10th Ed. Sec. 217. N. C. has not directly held on this point but
inferences from other decisions indicate accord with the majority. See Walsh
v. Hall (1871) 66 N. C. 233.
'Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn., 341; 53 Atl. 729 (1902).
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material factor which caused the owner to enter the contract and as
a result make a fundamental change of position. It was held that
redress could be secured by putting the parties back in their original
position. 7
It would seem, then, that the minority of cases reaches a more
logical and just result in recognizing fraud as ground for rescission,
even in the absence of damage, whei'e such fraud is a material
cause for entering a contract which would not otherwise have been
consummated.8
F. B. GUumEY, 2D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FUNCTION OF JUDICIARY IN CONSTRU-
ING STATUTES-EFFECT OF DECISION OVERRULING FORMER DE-
CISION-The legal effect of a decision of the Supreme Court over-
ruling a former decision of that body in the construction of a legis-
lative enactment is presented in a recent North Carolina case.1 The
situation presented by that case may be more easily understood by
setting out the facts chronologically, as follows:
1876-Statute passed requiring the register of deeds to index and
cross index the names of all parties to deeds and other instru-
ments calling for registration.
2
1887-Deed No. 1 by joint grantors to the plaintiff's predecessors in
title. The name of one of the joint grantors did not appear
on the register's index.
1894-Decision of Supreme Court in Davis v. Wlhitaker,8 constru-
ing the statute to mean that the filing of a deed for registra-
tion was in itself constructive notice and that the register's
failure to make a proper index of the names of the parties
to a conveyance did not impair its efficacy.
1914-Deed No. 2. Conveyance to plaintiff.
1918-Decision of Supreme Court in Fowle v. Ham,4 reversing its
previous holding in 1894 and deciding that indexing of the
names of parties to a deed is an essential part of registration.
1924-Deed No. 3. Conveyance to defendant from the joint grantor
of Deed No. 1, whose name had not been indexed.
"Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn., 341; 53 At]. 729 (1902).
8Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1525. Page on Contracts, Sec. 128, 146. 32
Yale Law Journal, 92. Barnes v. Cen. Savings Bank (1910), 149 Iowa 128,
128 N. W. 541. Morrow v. Ursini (1921) 96 Conn. 219, 113 Atl. 388.
1 Wilkinson et als v. Wallace (1926) 192 N. C. 156, 134 S. E. 401.
2 C. S. 3561.
'Davis v. Whitaker (1894) 114 N. C. 279, 19 S. E. 699.
'Fowle v. Ham (1918) 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639.
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In an action to quiet title, the defendant contended that under
the decision of Fowle v. Ham, in 1918, the plaintiff did not get a
good title as against the defendant, because, under that decision,
Deed No. 1, not being properly recorded, was not constructive notice
to a subsequent purchaser and that therefore the defendant took as
a purchaser for value without notice, and his title should prevail
over the plaintiff's title.
The question presented was whether the decision of Fole v.
Ham was prospective or retrospective, and, if the latter, whether the
plaintiff's title is protected under the decision of Davis v. Whitaker
in 1894. The court held that "As a rule, a decision of a court of
supreme jurisdiction, overruling a former decision is no doubt retro-
spective---'not that the overruled decision was bad law, but that it
never was the law. (Italics by author). To this rule there is a
recognized exception. It is this: 'Where a constitutional or statute
law has received a given construction 'by the courts of last resort,
and contracts have been made and rights acquired under and in
accordance with such construction, such contracts may not be invali-
dated, nor vested rights acquired under them impaired by a change
of construction made by a subsequent decision.'-5 Decision was
The above quotation from the court's opinion represents the
weight of authority. The effect, however, is to make two classes of
cases, the first including all cases not involving the construction of
a statute and the second including those cases in which a constitu-
tional provision or statute has received a given construction. As
to the first, an overruling decision acts retrospectively. As to the
second, an overruling decision acts prospectively only. Applied to
the instant case, it means that the decision of Fowle v. Ham in 1918
did not act retrospectively but that the plaintiff's rights are deter-
mined by the overruled decision of Davis v. Whitaker.
Earlier N. C. decisions point to another approach to this ques-
tion. In State v. Bell,6 Connor J. said,
"While it is true that no man has a vested right in a decision of
the court, it is equally settled that, where in the construction of a
contract or in declaring the law respecting its validity, the court
thereafter reverses its decision, contractual rights acquired by virtue
'Wilkinson v. Wallace (1926) 192 N. C. 156, 157, 134 S. E. 401.
accordingly for the plaintiff.
"State v. Bell (1904) 136 N. C. 674, 677, 49 S. E. 163.
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of the law as declared in the first opinion will not be disturbed."
(Italics by author).
A few years later, Justice Walker advanced another theory when
he said,
"The true rule is to give a change of judicial construction in
respect to a statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and
existing contract rights that would be given to legislative amend-
ment; that is to say, its operation must be prospective and not retro-
spective. . . . A change of decision is to all intents and pur-
poses the same in effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by
means of legislative enactment."
'7
In State v. Fulton8 Justice Brown said, "The judicial interpre-
tation becomes, as it were, a part of the law itself," and Justice
Walker, in a concurring opinion in the same case, said,
"As said in the opinion of the court, in the present case, the
judicial interpretation of the statute becomes part of the statute, and
if that interpretation is afterwards changed or modified, the defend-
ant should be tried under the law as it had been declared to be at
the time the alleged offense was committed, simply because it was
the law at that time . . . a decision of this court is the law until
it is overruled."
The approach taken by these earlier North Carolina decisions
indicates that there are times when a court actually makes law, and
when an overruling decision changes the law. This is contrary to
the orthodox conception of the judicial function which is that a
court can only find or declare the law. To conform to this orthodox
conception, the court in the present case holds to the general rule
that a decision acts retrospectively, except in cases involving statu-
tory construction. The result in the principal case would be the
same whether the court adopted this general rule with its exception
or the view expressed in the earlier cases that an overruling decision
changes the law. As a matter of policy, it might be sounder to admit
that courts actually make law and that a decision is law until over-
ruled. This would have the added advantage of giving a rule which
would apply to all cases without exception.
J. Q. LEGRAND.
'Hill v. R. R. (1906) 143 N. C. 539, 579, 55 S. E. 854.
'State v. Fulton (1908) 149 N. C. 485, 487, 63 S. E. 145.
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CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-NATURE OF CRIMINAL
ACT-FIRING OF Two SHOTs As ONE AcT-It is well established
both at common law and by constitutional and statutory provision,
that one cannot be prosecuted twice for the same "act" or "offense." 1
This is not true where one act constitutes more than one offense.
When one act violates the law of two jurisdictions, the offender is
amenable to both.2 Thus a single act may be an offense against
both North Carolina and the United States. In such a situation, the
offender may be prosecuted under the law of either or both, and a
conviction or an acquittal in either the state or the federal court is
no bar to a prosecution in the other.3
What is an act? Is it the muscular contraction of the fingers,
the physical act of pulling the trigger of a revolver; is it the conse-
quences flowing from that physical movement; is it the physical
force used plus the mental attitude, the volition? South Carolina
holds that an act is determined by the consequences thereof, that
there may be as many acts as there are results.4 If A fire a gun at
B and kills B and C, he may be prosecuted for two crimes in South
Carolina. The New Jersey court, however, assumes an entirely
different position, holding that it is the character of the act and not
the results which flow from it which determine the question of guilt
or innocence. 5 Georgia holds to the "same transaction" rule, i.e., the
plea of former acquittal or conviction is sufficient whenever the proof
shows the second case to be of the same transaction with the first.8
Mr. Justice Holmes defines an act as "a muscular contraction, and
something more."
7
Most courts today recognize that there must be more than the
mere physical movement to constitute an act or offense. A takes
B's hand and strikes C. B, although a physical actor, would be
relieved of all liability. It is A, the one with the volition, who is the
wrongdoer. Again: A forcibly guides B's hand and forces his
'3 Greenleaf, Evidence, sec. 35; 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 978; U. S.
Const.. Amdt. V.
'State v. Cross (1888) 101 N. C. 770, 7 S. E. 715; United States v-
Barnhart (1884) 22 Federal 285.
'Moore v. Illinois, 12 How. (U. S.) 13; Cross v. North Carolina (1889) 132
N. C. 131.
'State v. Corbitt (1921) 117 S. C. 356, 109 S. E. 133.
'State v. Rosa (1905) 72 N. J. L. 462, 62 Atl. 695.
eRoberts v. State (1853) 14 Ga. 8; Gully v. State (1902) 116 Ga. 527, 42
S.-E. 790.
0. W. Holmes, Jr., "The Common Law," Chap. II, p. 54.
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signature. There is no act chargeable to B because there was no
will attendant. A points a gun at B and so induces him to sign a
note. There is the physical act in such a case, but it produces few
if any legal consequences because there is a lack of free volition.
In a recent case the defendant fired a revolver twice in rapid suc-
cession at A. The bullets missed A entirely but did strike B and C,
bystanders, killing both. The defendant was acquitted in open court
of the murder of B and now pleads that acquittal in defense of a
prosecution for the killing of C. Held, the plea of former acquittal
is a good defense. State v. Houchins, 134 S. E. 740 (W. Va. 1926).
This decision goes on the ground that because the two shots are
impelled by the same impulse, the same emotion,-one volition, they
are, in fact, one and the same act-one offense. Suppose these two
situations: First, A shoots once but kills B and C. The authority is
to the effect that there is but one offense,-one indictable act.8
Second, A, under the stress of different impulses, shoots twice and
kills B and C. Obviously in such a situation there are two separate
offenses,--two indictable acts.9 The present case involves the
ground between these two situations. It has the one volition element
of the first illustration and the two physical movements of the
second, and the court holds that the determining factor in deciding
how many offenses there are is the "single volition" involved rather
than the two muscular movements used in pulling the trigger. To
hold differently would be to base an offense upon the extent of the
defendant's activity without regard to the character of the action,
the impelling volition, or the result.10
C. R. JONAS.
EvIDENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR As APPLIED TO ILLNESS FOL-
LOWING DRINKING OF BOTTLED PRODUcT-In Lamb v. Boyles' the
plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries sustained from drinking a
bottle of strawberry ale which defendant had manufactured and put
on the market. Plaintiff was taken sick while drinking the ale,
'Gunter v. State (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 56 Am. S. Rep. 17; Clem v. State
(1873) 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. Rep. 369; Seadberry v. State (1898) 39 Tex. Crim.
466, 46 S. W. 639.
'Kel~v v. State (Tex.-1901) 62 S. W. 915; State v. Nash (1881) 86 N. C.
650; State v. Malpass (1924) 189 N. C. 349, 127 S. E. 248.
1 See: Moss v. State (Ala.-1917) 75 So. 179; Cook v. State (Tex.-1901)
63 S. W. 873; Woodford v. People (N. Y.-1875) 20 Am. Rep. 464; Rufin v.
State (Ga.-1922) 114 S. E. 581.
'Lamb v. Boyles (1926) 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. E. 464.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
vomited, was carried home, suffered from impaired eyesight, and
was confined to his bed for several days. There was no direct evi-
dence of foreign matter in the ale, no specific indication of poison,
and no evidence of a defect either actually or constructively known
to the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover by
resorting to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that the circum-
stances of the injury were not such as would justify a jury in infer-
ring negligence on the part of the defendant as a cause of the
condition.
Res ipsa loquitur2 means that the thing speaks for itself, i.e., that
the circumstances themselves are of such a character as to amount
to evidence of negligence. In North Carolina the phrase is used
synonymously with prima facie case,s and the effect is merely to give
the plaintiff the advantage of a footing in the case, the jury being
authorized, but not required, to infer negligence from the facts
proved. 4 This view seems to represent the better weight of author-
ity.5 However, some jurisdictions hold that the effect of the doc-
trine, where it applies, is to raise a presumption which requires a
verdict unless rebutted, 6 and other jurisdictions go so far as to say
that the defendant is required to show freedom of negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence.
7
Hoke, J., states the rule for the application of the doctrine as
follows: "When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the
management use the proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from a want of care." This statement is in accord with well con-
sidered cases of other jurisdictions, 9 and seems to be the general
conception of the doctrine. 10
"Discussed in 12 Cal. L. Rev. 138.
" White v. Hines (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31.
'Stewart v. Carpet Co. (1905) 138 N. C. 60, 50 S. E. 562; Austin v. R. R_
(1924) 187 N. C. 7, 121 S. E. 1; Hunt v. Eure (1925) 189 N. C. 482, 127 S. E.
593.
'Sweeney v. Erving (1912) 228 U. S. 233; Plumb v. Richmond Light Co.
et al. (1922) 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504; see 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d
ed.) sec. 2509 and cases cited.
5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) secs. 2487 to 2490 incl.
See note L. R. A. 1916A 930 and 935.
'Fitz.qerald v. R. R. (1906) 141 N. C. 530, 54 S. E. 391.
Griffin v. Maurice (1901) 163 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925; Howser v. R. R.
Co. (1894) 80 Md. 146, 30 AtI. 906." 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) sec. 2509.
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So the doctrine has been held to apply to cases where passengers
are injured by machinery or appliances wholly under the carrier's
control,'" to cases of injuries from falling electric wires, 12 and other
falling objects,' 3 to derailments 14 and head-on collisions, 15 to com-
munications of fire by locomotives, 16 to cases of bursting boilers, 17
etc. In the cases of bottled beverages the doctrine has been held to
apply where the consumer is injured as a result of the presence of
a decomposed mouse or rat,'3 the presence of a cigar stub, 19 the
presence of broken glass, 20 and other deleterious substances in the
contents of the bottle where the presence of the foreign matter is
directly proved.
It is generally held, however, that the doctrine does not apply
to a mere bursting of a bottle containing a carbonated drink,2 1 and
has been held not to apply to a case where a tack was found in a
piece of blueberry pie made and sold on defendant's premises, the
tack being so small that it might have been imbedded in a berry
and not discovered by the use of reasonable diligence.
22
It seems that in practically all cases where the doctrine has been
held to apply the physical cause or source of the injury is obvious
and undisputed, the effect of the doctrine being to establish de-
fendant's negligence and not to establish the physical facts of the
injury. In such cases the doctrine is relied on merely to support the
plaintiff's claim as to the quality of the defendant's conduct, i.e.,
negligence, the physical cause or source of the injury having been
directly proved.
But in the principal case of Lamb v. Boyles there is only circum-
stantial evidence of the physical cause of the injury, and the plaintiff
aMcCord v. Atl. & C. Air Line R. Co. (1903) 134 N. C. 53, 45, S. E. 1031.1 Haynes v. Gas Co. (1894) 114 N. C. 203, 19 S. E. 344, 26 L. R. A. 810.
,20 R. C. L. 157 et seq.; 15 L. R. A. 33 and note.
14 Craig v. Lumber Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 560, 118 S. E. 8.
15 Hinnant v. Power Co. (1924) 187 N. C. 288, 121 S. E. 540.
Currie v. R. R. (1911) 156 N. C. 419, 72 S. E. 488.
Harris v. Mangum (1922) 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177.
Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1915) 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155,
L. R. A. 1916B 877; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Barksdale (1920) 17 Ala. App.
606. 88 So. 36.
" Boyd v. Bottling Works (1915) 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80.
" Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co. (1905) 124 Ga, 121, 52 S. E. 152, 1 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1778, 110 Am. St. Rep. 157.
2120 R. C. L. 157 footnote 1; Dail v. Taylor (1909) 151 N. C. 824, 66 S.
E. 135.
" Ashe v. Dining Hall (1918) 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R. 1556.
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is relying on circumstantial evidence not only as to negligence, but
also as to whether in fact there was any injurious substance in the
bottle, and, if so, whether his illness resulted from that source.
Here the plaintiff is asking for two inferences, i.e., he is trying to
use the doctrine as a bridge across two gaps rather than one. So
the facts of the instant case seems to be distinguishable from the
facts of those cases where the doctrine has generally been held to
apply.
Nevertheless the doctrine has been so used as to establish two
inferences. In Lawrence v. Power Co.,23 circumstantial evidence
was relied on to show that a fire was caused by defendant and it
was held that such fact, so established, was of itself evidence of
negligence. Obviously the greater the number of inferences allowed
the weaker each subsequent inference in the chain becomes, and the
most difficult it will be to establish the results desired.
Perhaps the phrase "res ipsa loquitur" may sometimes obscure
the realities. It simply represents instances where the courts by
repeated decisions have standardized certain rulings as to the suffi-
ciency of often occurritig types of circumstantial evidence cases.
But no such standardization should override the court's exercise of
judgment in each particular case as to the question: could a reason-
able man from the evidence draw the inferences desired? The court
seems on this basis to have reached the correct result in the instant
case.
Whether the defendant in the principal case would have been
liable on an implied warranty of the quality of the ale was not con-
sidered since the basis of the plaintiff's action was the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant in putting the ale in a bottle containing a
deleterious substance. The general rule is that warranties run only
in favor of an immediate purchaser,2 4 but several recent cases
impose the absolute liability of a warrantor on a manufacturer in
favor of the ultimate consumer.25 Had the plaintiff brought his
action on an implied warranty, the result of the instant case might
not have been the same.
C. W. HALL.
"Lawrence v. Power Co. (1925) 190 N. C. 664, 130 S. E. 735.
"I Williston on Sales (2d ed.) see. 244.
"Ward v. M. City Sea Food Co. (1916) 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958; Davis
v. Packin.q Co. (1920) 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382; I Williston on Sales
(2d ed.) sec. 244, footnote 47.
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LIENS AND PLEDGEs-AsSIGNMENT OF BOOK ACCOUNTS TO CREDI-
TOR-EFFECT OF ALLOWING DEBTOR TO RETAIN POSSESsION-In
Sneeden et al. v. Nurnberger's Market (1926) 192 N. C. 439, 135
S. E. 328, the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of the creditors for
collection of their accounts and the appointment of a receiver of the
defendant's business. The defendant had assigned to Swift & Co.,
one of its creditors, all of his book accounts, debts due from custo-
mers, etc., to serve as a continuing security for the defendant's
present and prospective indebtedness to the assignee. Swift & Co.
thereupon reassigned same to defendant in trust for itself and for
collection. Neither assignment was registered.
The court held that Swift & Co. has no lien or preference upon
the assigned accounts by virtue of this assignment, and that the pro-
ceeds from the collection of the accounts are general assets in the
hands of the receiver. The reasons assigned are: (1) If the contract
between the defendant and Swift & Co. be construed as a mortgage,
it was voidable as to defendant's creditors because it was not regis-
tered. C. S. 3311. (2) If it be construed merely as a pledge to
secure a pre-existing debt, it was not enforceable because the lien
was not maintained. To make a valid pledge, the pledgee's actual
or constructive possession of the article is essential and the
restoration of possession to the pledgor, as a rule, is inconsistent
with the pledge. (3) There are cases which hold that the pledgee
may redeliver the property to the pledgor for the purpose of having
it sold for the benefit of the pledgee. This exception is limited to
those cases in which the pledgor is acting as agent of the pledgee,
who remains in constructive possession. It does not apply to this
case where the defendant mingled pledged and unpledged funds with
the consent of Swift and Co.
C. R. JONAS.
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-FOREEEABILITY AS A TEST-
A city allowed a street bordering a municipal aviation field to fall
into such disrepair as to be impassable. To permit passage a detour
was maintained across the corner of such field. An aeroplane struck
the car of a motorist while he was driving on this detour, causing
his death. In a suit against the city, alleging negligent failure to
repair the street as the cause of the death, it was held: "The alleged
acts of negligence were not the proximate cause of the injuries." 1
'Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap et al. (1926) 134 S. E. 563 (Va.).
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In another case,2 fire in a small factory belonging to plaintiff's
intestate spread to his garage, thence to a pole of the defendant elec-
tric company, causing a high-power wire to fall. The insulation on
this wire was worn off. The arm of the pole projected over the
premises of the plaintiff so that when the wire fell it came into con-
tact with a wire fence along plaintiff's property line. Ignorant of
the danger, the plaintiff's intestate touched the wire fence and was
instantly killed. The alleged negligence was in maintaining the
wire over the premises in uninsulated condition, and failure to
repair after notice. Held: "The alleged negligence was not the
effective and proximate cause of the homicide."
The field of proximate cause in negligence cases is, at the present,
one of almost hopeless confusion. That there is a simple and logical
method for use in dealing with this question is shown in articles by
several text writers8 whose views are here followed.
In dealing with negligence cases, there are two problems
presented:
1. Was there actionable negligence toward the plaintiff; and
2. If so, was such negligence the cause of the injury?
To the first the courts apply the usual test for determining negli-
gence: would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances
have foreseen the injury. After this question is decided, the same
test is again repeated by most courts in deciding the question of
causal connection. Often negligence is assumed, and the above test
then used in determining whether the negligence caused the injury.
The fault lies in applying the "foreseeability" test to the second
question.
A negligence case should be dealt with first, by applying the
foreseeability test to determine the existence of negligence, then if
the defendant was negligent, he is liable for the consequences of his
act. Whether the injury was the consequence of his act is purely a
question of fact for the jury.4 It is argued that if courts follow
such a method, that, once negligence is established, liability extends
to every injury which flows therefrom, regardless of whether rea-
'Rome Railway & Light Co. v. Robinson (1926) 134 S. E. 132 (Ga.).
'Green, Negligence and Proximate Cause, 1 Texas L. Rev. 243 and 423;
Beale, Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633; Edgerton,
Legal Cause, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause,
39 Harv. L. Rev. 149.
'Collins v. Pecos & Northern Texas Ry. Co., 110 Texas 577; 212 S. W.
477.
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sonable foresight might anticipate it. But the answer to this argu-
ment is that when the jury finds negligence in the first issue, it has
already decided the question of whether reasonable foresight might
have anticipated the injury. Proper words in charging juries wilI
make this clear to them.
When an independant agency intervenes, it does not change the
application of the rule. If it should have been foreseen that an inter-
vening agency would appear so as to cause the injury, there is negli-
gence. If not, there is no negligence, and the question of causation
is completely eliminated. Foreseeability is an element of negligence
and not of causation. 5 Failure to so distinguish is the root of all
confusion on the subject.
In the case first quoted, a reasonably prudent person would not
have foreseen'that failure to repair the street would cause a person
to drive over the detour and there be killed by an aeroplane. There-
fore there was no negligence. The question of proximate cause need
not have been mentioned.
As to the second case, the defendant maintained high tension
wires on poles above the premises of others, and allowed the insula-
tion to become worn off. If a reasonably prudent man under such
circumstances might foresee that the uninsulated wire might fall
because of a fire burning down the pole or because of some other
intervening force, and thus come into contact with a wire fence
underneath, the defendant would be negligent. After determining
negligence the death can be directly traced to the uninsulated wire as
the cause. If a reasonably prudent man would not have foreseen
such injury, there would be no negligence. In such case, even
though the injury can be directly traced to the original act, there can
be no recovery because of failure to find negligence. So again there
was no problem of proximate cause, but only a question of
negligence.
J. L. CANTWELL, JR.
PERSONS-MARRIAGE-EFFECT OF STATUTE ON VOIDABLITY OF
MARRIAGE OF INFANT UNDER TwELvE-In the recent South Caro-
lina case of State v. Sellers,' A, a girl 11 years old, married B. She
lived with B for four weeks, and then, before she was twelve years
'Collins v. Ry. Co., supra.1State v. Sellers (1926) 134 S. E. 873.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
old, left him and has not lived with him since. (Except for this act
on her part there has been nothing done to indicate annulment of
the marriage). Thereafter A went through a marriage ceremony
with defendant, with whom she lived for a short while. She was
then 23 years of age. Defendant later left A without having ob-
tained a decree of annulment, and married C. Defendant was
indicted for bigamy on account of his marriage with C, the indict-
ment being based on the fact that his marriage to A was valid and
subsisting. Defense: that defendant's marriage to A was void for
that A was at that time married to B.
If the marriage of A to B was void-or if it was voidable and
has been annulled and the bond broken by the act of A in leaving B
at the end of four weeks of married life-then defendant's marriage
to A was valid, and his subsequent marriage to C was bigamous.
Otherwise, his attempted marriage to A was void and his subsequent
marriage to C was valid and lawful.
The court held, Cochran, J., dissenting, that it was error for the
trial court to charge that if A was under 12 years of age at the time
she attempted to contract matrimony with B that such marriage was
void and that a subsequent marriage of A with defendant was conse-
quently valid. The appellate court ordered a verdict of not guilty
entered in the case.
The substance of the statutory provisions brought to the atten-
tion of the court as applicable are:
1. When the validity of a marriage is doubted or disputed by
either of the parties, the other may institute a suit to affirm its
vqlidity; and the decree of the court shall be binding on all concerned.
2. The court of common pleas shall have authority to determine
the validity of any marriage and to declare such contracts void for
want of consent of either party, or for other cause; provided, that
such contract was not consummated by cohabitation of the parties.2
Before the above acts no court in South Carolina had power to
annul a marriage for any cause.3 But now the court of common
pleas has power to declare a mariage void for any cause which shows
that the marriage at the time entered into was not a contract, this
power being subject to the proviso therein contained as to cohabita-
'Secs. 5531 and 5532, vol. 3, Code of 1922.
'Mattison v. Mattison (1846) 1 Strob. Eq. (20 S. C. Eq.) 387, 47 Am. Dec.
541; Bowers v. Bowers (1858) 10 Rich. Eq. (30 S. C. Eq.) 555, 73 Am.
Dec. 99.
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tion. This point was brought out in Davis v. Whitlock.4  This
holding is in accord with the express language of the statute. But
the court in the instant case, after citing with approval Davis v.
Whlitlock, said, "We are inclined to think that we may go another
step or two in the matter of protecting young womanhood and sav-
ing little children the stigma of being pronounced illegitimate; and it
is clear in our minds that the Legislature intended this to be done."
The court then construed the statute referred to to mean that no
marriage could be annulled except by the court of common pleas. It
seems that this construction is, in the light of previous decisions in
South Carolina and of the well-established rules of statutory con-
struction, debatable, to say the least. It is admitted that the common
law prevails in South Carolina as to the age of consent to marry.
At the common law the action of A in leaving her husband before
arriving at the age of consent and refusing to live with him after-
wards would have avoided the marriage.5
The court points out that under the loose system of the common
law allowing persons to annul their own marriages it would be diffi-
cult to determine in many cases whether persons were married or
not, thus throwing grave doubt on titles to property in some in-
stances, involving sale of real estate, dower rights, etc. These are
the proper reasons to advance, no doubt, to justify the legislature in
changing this law, once the intention of the lawmakers to make the
change is established. It is a familiar rule that it is to be presumed
that the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless
the statute plainly indicates such an intention.6
Before these statutes the anomolous situation existed in South
Carolina that the parties to a voidable marriage could themselves
annul it in proper time, but that the courts had no power to declare
'Davis v. Whitlock (1911) 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171, Anno. Cas. 1913D,
538.
'At the common law a marriage under the age of seven is absolutely void;
persons marrying between the ages of seven and twelve in case of females or
between seven and fourteen in case of males, may, in effect, annul their own
marriages by doing such acts after arriving at the age of consent as will show
that they disaffirm the contract. 1 Black. Corn. 436; 18 R. C. L. p. 441, par. 70.
The case of Koonce v. Wallace (1859) 52 N. C. 194 states the rule as to
affirmance, holding that cohabitation after arriving at the age of consent will
affirm the marriage. As to disaffirmance, it seems that the parties should be
able to avoid the marriage by acts showing such intent before as well as after
arriving at the age of consent.
6 25 P_ C. L. p. 1054, par. 280.
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a marriage void for any reason.7 In the light of this situation it is
reasonable to believe that the intent of the Legislature was to give
this power to the court without taking away the existing power of
the parties themselves. That such was the intent has previously been
intimated by the South Carolina court: "We shall first endeavor
to show that changes in the constitutional and statute law have de-
stroyed the force of these cases8 and that jurisdiction to declare mar-
riages void ab initio has been conferred upon the courts of common
pleas." 9
Granting that it was the intention of the Legislature that the
statute be construed as in this case, it seems that the purpose of the
law-making body would have been better accomplished and the social
welfare better subserved if the parties had been allowed to retain
the common law right of disaffirmance, and provision had been made
that issue resulting from intercourse before such disaffirmance sould
be legitimate. S. E. VEST.
SLANDER-DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ACTIONABLE PER SE
AND WoRDs REQUIRING PRooF OF SPECIAL DAMAGE-In the recent
case of Deese v. Collins1 plaintiff brought action to recover damages
for slander. Defendant falsely stated that plaintiff, a white man,
had negro blood in his veins. Held that the words by defendant
were not actionable per se, and plaintiff could not recover without
showing special damages. The words do not impute a crime or mis-
demeanor punishable by an infamous penalty, they do not charge the
plaintiff with having an infectious or loathsome disease, and do not
relate to plaintiff's trade or profession. This case shows that the
North Carolina Court adheres to the common law distinction be-
tween words actionable per se and those actionable only by proof of
special damages.2  C. W. HALL.
' Cases in note 3 supra.
' These cases, the force of which are held to be destroyed, are Mattison v.
Mattison (1846) 1 Strob. Eq. 387, 47 Am. Dec. 541, in which it was held that
a court of equity in South Carolina has no power to annul a marriage con-
tracted while the plaintiff was in a fit of delirium tremens; and Bo-wers v.
Bowers (1858) 10 Rich. Eq. 555, 73 Am. Dec. 99, holding that a court of
equity could not annul a marriage because of relationship (in this case a mar-
riage between uncle and niece).
'Davis v. Whitlock (1911) 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171, Anno. Cas. 1913D,
538.
'Deese v. Collins (1926) 191 N. C. 749; 133 S. E. 92.
' See Chapin on Torts (Hornbook series) page 304.
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TRIALS-POWER OF FEDERAL JUDGES TO COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
-IMPROPER COMMENT-In Cook v. United States (1926) 14 Fed.
(2d) 833, the defendant, a constable, was indicted for conspiring to
violate the National Prohibition Act by agreeing to furnish immunity
from arrest to a moonshiner. The consideration was $40 a month.
The receipt of money by defendant was proved. The government
contended and the evidence tended to show that it was for a bribe.
The defendant admitted receiving the money but contended that it was
in payment for gasoline tickets. The court in commenting on the
evidence said that he gave no credence to defendant's statement and
that he believed it was an afterthought. The court repeated this,
and later said again that the defendant's statement did not look
reasonable to him. Subsequently, the court returned to the subject
again saying that he did not believe the defendant's contention.
Defendant assigned these remarks as error.
Held: The comment is reversible error.
It is intimated that any of the remarks taken separately would
have been proper, for the right of the judge to comment on the
evidence "is one of the most valuable features of the practice in the
courts of the United States."' But the remarks, taken together,
were prejudicial, for by their reiteration the remarks were taken out
of the catagory of fair comment and became partisan argument,
leading the jury to a conclusion based on the judge's comments
rather than on their impartial weighing of the evidence. The de-
fendant had the right to have the jury consider the case unweakened
by argument from the bench. The distinction seems to lie between
dispassionate and judicial comment on the evidence and comment
that is argumentative and partial.
2
S. E. VEST.
'Rudd v. United States (1909) 173 Fed. 912.
2 Lewis V. United States (1925) 8 Fed. (2nd) 849. For examples of the
abuse of solicitor in state court of his right to comment on the evidence, the
defendant's appearance, etc., see Improper Comment Before Jury, 3 N. C. Law
Rev. 132.
